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Abstract
Purpose –This paper investigates whether short-timework (STW) schemeswere successful in their objective
of maintaining employment and keeping workers employed within the same firms after the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in 2008.
Design/methodology/approach – Spanish longitudinal administrative data has been used, making it
possible to identify short-time work (STW) participation not only of workers but also of employers and
allowing to know the future labour market status of participants and non-participants. Accordingly, treatment
and control groups are defined, and Propensity Score Matching models estimated. The dependent variable is
measured as the probability that an individual remained employed with the same employer in the future (one,
two and three years) after implementation of a STW arrangement.
Findings – Our results suggest that treated individuals are about 5 percentage points less likely to remain
working with the same employer one year later than similar workers, and this negative effect of participation
increases over time. Thus, STW schemes would not have the assumed effect of preventing unemployment by
keeping the participants employed relative to non-participants.
Research limitations/implications – As our analysis is based on the comparison of the employment
trajectories of participant and non-participant workers in firms that have used STW arrangements, our
findings cannot be interpreted as the job saving effects of either macro or micro studies carried out previously.
Practical implications – The analysis carried out in the paper is complementary to the country-level and
firm-level approaches that have been used in the empirical literature.
Originality/value – We adopt a worker-level approach. This is novel since no previous study has focused
attention on the impact of STW participation on the subsequent labour market status of workers.
Keywords Short-time work, Employment stability, Worker-level longitudinal data, Propensity score
matching
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The objective of short-time work (STW) schemes is to preserve jobs at firms experiencing
temporarily low demand by encouraging work-sharing. In these schemes, the contract of an
employee with the firm is maintained during the period of reduced hours or the suspension of
work, providing income support to these workers. Nearly all OECD countries currently
operate public STW schemes (OECD, 2010).
Academic and political interest in STWusually upsurges in times of economic crisis. This
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negative financial and economic situation of 2008–2009 with the strongest downturn in
decades, fighting unemployment was one of the most important tasks of European countries.
Most governments took specific measures in response to the crisis to promote the use of STW
schemes, by weakening eligibility and conditionality requirements and increasing
generosity, while others established new programs (Eurofound, 2010; Panteia, 2012) [1].
The question is whether these measures contributed to the maintenance of jobs.
The empirical evidence shows that during the last downturn the decline in employment
has been small in some countries compared with what would have been expected given the
size of the decline in output, due in large part to reductions in average hours having accounted
for an unusually high share of the total adjustment in labour input (see, for instance, OECD,
2010). Several analysts and policy-makers have attributed the good performance of some
national labourmarkets (in particular, the German one) to the role played by STW schemes to
provide a buffer for downward adjustment during the economic cycle, although their
contribution to maintain employment and to avoid dismissals is still not without dispute [2].
Whether that is in fact the case remains uncertain, because there has been little systematic
evaluation of the employment preserving effect of work-sharing during the crisis. This has
been done by the otherwise limited empirical literature, with contradicting results (see below).
This article attempts to contribute to fill this evidence gap by estimating the impact of STW
arrangements on the continuation of employment relationships.
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. Firstly, we carry out aworker-level approach.
This implies that, using individual data, we examine whether STW schemes achieve their
stated goal of keeping workers employed within the same companies. Secondly, we employ
longitudinal administrative data. The database used presents at least three advantages for
the analysis of STW schemes and its impact on labour market outcomes of workers: the
information is available, accurate and detailed on the jobs held by the individuals and on the
spells of receipt of unemployment benefits (UB); it makes it possible to identify STW
participation not only of workers but also of employers; and it allows to know the subsequent
labour market status of participants and non-participants after the implementation of a STW
scheme by companies, i.e. remainingworkingwith the same employer, being employedwith a
different firm or being jobless. Thus, our approach allows us to focus attention on the impact
of STW participation on the subsequent trajectories of workers. This is novel since empirical
studies usually use either country-level or firm-level data. Examining whether STW
programs keep workers employed in the same company is relevant since, when using either
country- or firm-level data, one is unable to evaluate the effect of STW on individual labour
market biographies. This implies that it may well be that, even when no employment
preserving effect of STW on either the country or the establishment level is found, STW
might contribute to prevent individual unemployment. Therefore, our analysis fits in with the
theoretical debate onwhether work-sharing can reduce unemployment. Moreover, our results
could be used to improve theoretical models on employment adjustment decisions made by
companies, but also models on worker turnover.
Accordingly, in the empirical analysis carried out, treatment and control groups are
defined, and the labour market transitions of both groups examined. The dependent variable
is measured as the probability that an individual, who was already employed at the time of
the implementation of such arrangement, remained employed with the same employer in the
future (one, two and three years after implementation). The evaluation method we use is
matching based on the propensity score. We examine the sensitivity of estimates of program
impacts across alternative algorithms to match participants and nonparticipants and
perform several robustness checks to gauge whether unobserved characteristics (the so-
called “hidden bias”) may play a role (i.e. whether the chance of STW participation is
correlated with unobserved factors that determine both eligibility for STW and employment
retention, thus inducing a bias on the STW participation effect).
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Our case study is Spain, a country that has not been investigated before in the area of
work-sharing despite its interest, given the supposedly strict employment protection
legislation and the importance of temporary employment [3]. The Spanish STWscheme is the
legal instrument used to protect employment in cases of exceptional circumstances, allowing
firms either to temporarily reduce employees’working time or to carry out temporary layoffs.
The STW scheme is financed by contributions (uniform payroll taxes) paid by employers and
workers, like unemployment insurance benefits. In order to benefit from STW schemes, prior
consultation with trade unions is required. The company must inform workers’
representatives of the reasons for the measures, their extent and expected duration, and
the number of employees involved. The procedure implies a process of negotiation on various
issues, including the number and types of job affected by the proposed measures, the details
of these measures and the criteria used to designate the workers involved (for instance,
workers’ representatives and employers may negotiate priorities of permanence for specific
groups, such as workers with family burdens or older workers). At the same time the firm has
to notify the labour authority, providing the necessary information to justify the measures
proposed (for more details, see Arranz et al., 2018).
The structure of the article runs as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the empirical
literature related to STW schemes and labour market outcomes. Section 3 presents the data
and the main variables. Section 4 outlines the econometric methods. Section 5 reports the
empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 discusses the findings and concludes.
2. Literature review
Lacking government intervention, there are several reasons by which employers (and even
workers) may prefer firings to STW as the way to adjust to declines in firms’ demand. These
reasons are mostly related to the nature of bargaining, technical restrictions and dynamic
effects of the two alternatives, and imply that STW requires the intervention of a “third party”
that subsidizes such schemes and penalizes firings (Rosen, 1985; Fitzroy and Hart, 1985; Hall,
1995). The analysis of unemployment insurance in a second-best environment featuring
imperfect financial markets suggests that a system combining STW arrangements with UB
seems more equitable and efficient than UB only (Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Cahuc and
Carcillo, 2011). This system can bemore efficient since it reduces excess layoffs encouraged by
the implicit subsidies paid out by the public unemployment insurance. It is also more equitable
because STW schemes distribute the adjustment burden over a larger number of workers.
Obviously, design features are important in affecting both their success among employers
and workers and its efficiency properties. There is considerable variation in the institutional
design of STW schemes across countries. This is likely to reflect different strategies for
balancing concerns about assuring adequate take-up while maintaining cost-effectiveness,
thus limiting potential deadweight and displacement effects. Dimensions such as the
strictness of eligibility and entitlement requirements, the conditionality requirements, and the
generosity, may significantly affect the take-up rates and the overall results of the STW
schemes (see Hijzen and Venn, 2011) [4]. Estimates of the impact of design features of STW
programs on take-up rates using cross-country time-series observations (Boeri and Bruecker,
2011; Hijzen and Martin, 2013; Lydon et al., 2019) confirm that more restrictive eligibility
requirements and higher costs for employers are associated with lower take-up rates and
lower responsiveness of take-up rates to output shocks. Restrictions on the permissible range
of working-time reductions lower the take-up rates and limit their responsiveness to changes
of output. Moreover, the inclusion of variables capturing labour market institutions reveals
that lower take-up rates are associated with less stringent employment protection legislation,
more generous UB systems and more decentralized wage bargaining structures.
Most studies on STW have focused on the analysis of the potential employment





used in the empirical literature. On the one hand, macro estimates are designed to exploit the
country and time variation in take-up rates to analyze the quantitative impacts of STW
schemes on labour market outcomes (Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Van Audenrode, 1994;
Arpaia et al., 2010; Hijzen and Venn, 2011). On the other hand, micro estimates are based on
establishment-or firm-level data and exploit the variation between participating and non-
participating employers within countries (Calavrezo et al., 2009, 2010, and Duhautois et al.,
2009, for France; Dietz et al., 2011, and Crimmann et al., 2012, for Germany).
Although previous studies do not usually take account of the potential endogeneity of
STW schemes, subsequent works do. On the macro side, they do this by instrumenting the
STW take-up rate (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011; Boeri and Bruecker, 2011; Hijzen and Martin,
2013). On the micro side, authors either use instruments based on the STW experience of
firms before the crisis (Boeri and Bruecker, 2011; Bellman et al., 2015) or apply propensity
score matching (PSM) techniques (Kato and Kodama, 2019). Macro studies tend to find short-
run positive impacts of STW on employment during the 2008–2009 recession. However,
deadweight costs seem to be sizable as well, especially in the medium run. The empirical
evidence from micro studies which control for STW endogeneity are less clear-cut, showing
either small positive effects or no effects at all on stabilizing employment or avoiding
dismissals, although some studies find more positive results (see Siegenthaler and Kopp,
2019, who find strong evidence that STW in Switzerland increased establishment survival
and prevented rather than postponed dismissals in the period 2009–2014).
Almost all studies on STW are conducted at country or company level. The analysis of the
effect of STW at the worker level is rare. Speckesser (2010) focuses on Germany during the
recession of 1993–1994 and, applying PSM techniques, finds very short-lived employment
effects of STW: the employment rate of participants is higher than non-participants during the
first three months after the beginning of the program but virtually the same afterwards. His
analysis also shows negative and significant wage effects for STW participants as compared
with non-participants in the long run (six years). Calavrezo and Lodin (2012) examine the
French program in 2008–2010 and, using quarterly data, find that the probability of
unemployment is twice as high for participants than non-participants within three months
after being in STW. However, their analysis is basically descriptive and does not take account
of firm effects, selection issues and the potential endogeneity of the STW variable.
Finally, Pavlopoulos and Chkalova (2019) investigates the effects of STW in surviving
firms in the Netherlands in 2009–2011. They apply a discrete-time survival model using a
dataset with monthly register data. Participants in the STWprogram are compared with two
control groups: non-participant workers from firms that used STW and workers from firms
that did not make use of the program. Their findings indicate that STW had a positive effect:
the risk of unemployment and job separation is lower for STW participants than non-
participant, although, after 25–30 months, STW participants exhibit the same hazard of
unemployment (job separation) asworkers from non-participant firms (non-participants from
firms that use STW).
Based on the results of the empirical literature and on theoretical considerations, we may
hypothesize that, if STW is an internal arrangement that, ceteris paribus, helps firms improve
their response to a demand shock, it would reduce the probability of unemployment for all
workers of the participant company (without differences among workers). However, it also
may be the case that STW can be used to create different perspectives for participant and
non-participant workers within an employer. For instance, firms could use STW
arrangements to protect their core staff during crises and to avoid brain drains (Crimmann
et al., 2012), so the likelihood of becoming unemployed would be different for participants
than non-participants. In the empirical section of the article, we try to test these predictions on
the impact of STW on the permanence of workers within firms.
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3. Econometric methods
Estimating the causal effect of STW participation on the permanence of workers in their jobs
implies being able to appraise the counterfactual situation in which those same workers are
instead not participating in STW. This is called the fundamental evaluation problem.
Another problem is the presence of selection bias, that is the possibility that STW workers
and non-STW workers could have significant differences even in the absence of treatment.
The econometric methodology we use is propensity score matching (PSM) [5]. Assumptions
along with this technique imply treatment estimates can be interpreted as causal.
The outcome variable is measured as the probability that an individual, who was already
employed at the time of the implementation of such arrangement, remains employed with the
same employer in the future (one, two and three years after implementation), while the
measure of exposure to a STW scheme is a variable indicating whether or not the worker was
involved in an arrangement at a given period. Therefore, two groups are identified: workers
affected by STW schemes (Ti 5 1) and workers not affected (Ti 5 0). PSM methods allow to
construct a statistical comparison group (C) based on a model of the probability of
participating in the treatment (T) conditional on observed characteristics, X, the so-called
propensity score:
PðXiÞ ¼ PrðTi ¼ 1jXiÞ (1)
with (0 < P(Xi) < 1). The average treatment effect of the program is calculated as the mean
difference in outcomes across these two groups. Under certain assumptions, Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) show that matching on P(X) is as good as matching on X.
The necessary assumptions for identification of the program effect are (1) conditional
independence and (2) presence of a common support. Conditional independence (or
unconfoundedness) states that, given a set of covariates, X, that are not affected by
treatment, potential outcomes, Y, are independent of treatment assignment, T: (Yi
T, Yi
C) ┴
TijXi. It implies that the uptake of the program is based on observed characteristics. As noted
by Imbens (2004), if the previous condition holds, conditioning on the propensity score
removes all biases due to observable attributes. Conditional independence is a strong
assumption. Nevertheless, due to the features of the process of negotiation between
employers and workers’ representatives (explained in the introduction section) and the set of
variables at our disposal in the dataset used in the empirical analysis (see below), we consider
that assuming selection on observables is justified in this case. Regarding the common
support (i.e. 0 < P(T5 1jXi) < 1), the basic intuition is that there has to be at least one similar
individual in the counterfactual state for each treated one. This condition ensures that
treatment observations have comparison observations “nearby” in the propensity score
distribution (Heckman et al., 1999).
The treatment effect of the program using these methods can be represented as either the
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) or the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET).
Typically, researchers can ensure internal as opposed to external validity of the sample, so
only theATET (the difference between the expected outcome of treated individuals who have
been treated and the expected outcome of treated individuals had not they been treated) is
estimated. To do so, weaker assumptions of conditional independence ((Yi
C)┴TijXi) aswell as
common support (P(T5 1jXi) < 1) are needed. In our estimations, we will impose a common
support by dropping treatment observationswhose pscore is either higher than themaximum
or lower than the minimum pscore of the controls. We will also test that there is not hidden
bias and, thus, that the conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds.
In practice, the PSMmust be estimated. The predicted values from standard logit or probit
models are normally used to estimate the propensity score for each observation in the
treatment and the control group samples. Using the propensity score, bPðXÞ, matched pairs





matchingmethods are used to do so and obtain estimates of the outcomes of those assigned to
treatment and those assigned to the control group (see Mueser et al., 2007, in the context of an
application in a workforce training setting, and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) [6].
4. Data
The data we use to investigate the impact of STW on the retention of workers within firms
come from the Continuous Sample of Working Life (Muestra Continua de VidasLaborales;
hereinafter, MCVL), an administrative dataset built upon the computerized records of the
Spanish Social Security. The reference population includes both workers registered with the
Social Security as working, as well as recipients of contributory and non-contributory
pensions and UB. This administrative dataset provides information on individual, job and
employer attributes as well as on the UB received by each worker in the event that they were
separated from their job and eligible to receive them (in particular, whether each individual
was receiving UB when out of work, the type of benefits, and the number of days of benefit).
This also applies to spells of benefit receipt while in STW because of either suspension of
contract or reduction of working time. For more details on the characteristics of the dataset,
see Arranz et al. (2013, 2014) [7].
The MCVL has a longitudinal design: an individual who is present in an edition of the
sample and subsequently remains registered with the Social Security stays as a sample
member. Its longitudinal nature makes it possible to know the subsequent labor market
status of a given individual after a STW scheme has been adopted in a company or a job
separation has taken place.
The production of unbiased estimates of a treatment effect through PSM methods
depends heavily on the quality of the data used. As pointed out byMueser et al. (2007), the use
of administrative data to obtain PSM estimates of the average treatment effect can be a very
effective tool. One reason for this is the fact that data on the outcome for both treated and
untreated individuals come from the same source. Another important characteristic is the
availability of large datasets. In our case, the use of longitudinal administrative data allows
us to have a representative sample of workers and a relatively rich set of variables to employ
in our analyses.
Our sample is limited to wage and salary individuals aged 16–59 who work in the non-
agriculture private economy (the individuals are registered with the General System of Social
Security in their current job), hold an open-ended contract, work full-time and have a job
tenure longer than one year. The purpose is to exclude those workers with a marginal
attachment to firms who cannot be potentially (and legally) eligible in the event that an
employer would decide to run a STW arrangement.
The outcome variable in our analysis is the labormarket status of the individual several
(one, two and three) years after the participation on STW has taken place. We take
advantage of the characteristics of the dataset to construct treatment and control groups.
An observation window (or period of entry) is defined which refers to the second quarter of
2009 (once the financial and economic crisis was on its height). The individuals starting a
spell of receipt of STW in this period conforms the treatment group. In fact, we select
individuals who begin STW spells anytime during the second quarter of 2009. Individuals
can start such a spell between the 1st of April 2009 and the 30th of June 2009, while their
successive entries into either the unemployment compensation system or other jobs may
occur until the 31st of December 2013 (the last day available in our dataset). The
comparison group is comprised of employed individuals who are not involved in STW
schemes during the afore-mentioned period (i.e. April 2009–December 2013). This implies
that the comparison group is not contaminated by either previous or future participation in
STW arrangements. In fact, we consider only non-participating workers in firms that have
made use of STW schemes. We do so because this is the group of workers that can be
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considered the most appropriate comparison group to carry out the evaluation exercise
proposed.
For each group defined according to their treatment status (treated and non-treated),
period one covers the quarter in which treatment (participation in STW) takes place, while
period two corresponds to one, two and three years later. In period two, the outcome is
measured by the individual’s permanence in employment within the same firm.
Table A1 of the Appendix provides summary statistics, separately for the sample of
treated and non-treated workers, for a comprehensive set of explanatory variables. These are
individual, job and employer attributes (gender, age, nationality, region, job category,
industry affiliation and size). When compared with non-participating workers in firms which
have run STW arrangements, the picture is that certain categories of workers and jobs are
over-represented among STW participants. These are male and older workers, long-tenured
employees, manual occupations, medium-sized and large employers (over 50 employees),
manufacturing industries, and the regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country.
5. Results
5.1 Simple means estimates
Table 1 provides descriptive evidence on labor market outcomes of the samples of the
treatment and control groups after one, two and three years. The top panel offers the detailed
information distinguishing all possible statuses, while the bottom panel provides a summary:
the first two rows show the mean proportion of employees who are still working with the
same employer distinguishing between treatment and control groups, and the final row offers













1 year later (2010Q2)
Control Obs 0 10,029 774 3 41 194 11,676
% 0.0 85.9 6.6 0.0 0.4 1.7 100
Treatment Obs 804 1,081 114 2 4 22 2,277
% 35.3 47.5 5.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 100
2 years later (2011Q2)
Control Obs 0 8,967 1261 22 111 489 11,676
% 0.0 76.8 10.8 0.2 1.0 4.2 100
Treatment Obs 352 1,294 263 3 10 67 2,277
% 15.5 56.8 11.6 0.1 0.4 2.9 100
3 years later (2011Q2)
Control Obs 0 8,101 1597 59 219 837 11,676
% 0.0 69.4 13.7 0.5 1.9 7.2 100
Treatment Obs 356 1,106 337 31 82 138 2,277








Control 85.9 76.8 69.4
Treatment 82.8 72.3 64.2


















The raw data presented in the table show that employment stability is lower in the
treatment group than in the control group and that the differential between both groups
increases over time (from 3.1 pp after one year to 4.5 pp after two years and 5.2 pp after three
years). This behavior is due to the fact that, although the proportion of workers remaining in
the same firm diminishes for both groups, it falls more intensively in the case of the treatment
group. Although this prima facie result would point out to a relatively unfavourable impact of
STW schemes on the stability of employment which is not only evident in the short run but
also in themedium run, the negative correlation between STWparticipation and employment
stability might not be reflecting causation. To answer formally the question onwhether STW
schemes keep jobs in the same firm and therefore they have a causal effect on the preservation
of employment, we use PSM methods.
5.2 Matching estimates
Finding perfect matches between STW participants and nonparticipants on all relevant
observable pre-treatment characteristics can be a rather complicated task. PSM methods
involve matching individuals with similar likelihoods of exposure to STW schemes. The
theory assures us, in principle, that the distribution of independent variables will be the same
across cases with a given propensity score, even when values differ for a particular matched
pair. The matching process models the probability of participation and matches individuals
with similar propensity scores. Our estimate of P(X) to participate in STW is based on a probit
model, where the dependent variable is the treatment (T) regressed against a set of observable
personal, job and firm characteristics which are not influenced by the employer decision to
put an employee in STW work. The variables we have chosen include gender, nationality,
age, job category, firm size, industry affiliation and region [8].
The estimated marginal effects of the probit model on the probability of STW
participation (see Table 2) suggest that male, Spanish, older workers are more likely to be
chosen to participate and that the job category, the industry affiliation and the employer size
seem to play an important role in determining that probability. Thus, being employed in blue-
collar medium-skilled jobs, in medium and large firms (at least 50 employees) and in heavy
manufacturing increases that likelihood. The result on the effect of industry is substantial
and reflects the fact that STW tends to be concentrated in the goods-producing sector and
that incentives to hoard labor may be stronger there due to the greater importance of firm-
specific skills [9].
One of the key for the validity of the PSM (estimated with a probit model) is the overlap or
common support condition. The range of control variables included in the probit regression
makes it likely that the outcome of the treated and control group, given the propensity score,
differs only due to treatment and, hence, the CIA holds. To ensure that this probability is met,
we have proceededwith a graphical analysis, plotting the propensity score distribution for the
treated and control groups to look at the overlap thatwe have achieved. Results (not shownbut
available upon request) suggests that the overlap is quite good, although differences in the
density of the propensity score can be observed in the tails of the distribution.
Another method to confirm the previous results is the min-max method to discard from
our analysis the treated observations that are outside the common support region. This
method involves finding theminima andmaxima of the propensity score distribution for both
the treated (0.0003306, 0.9445475) and control group (4.84e-07, 0.9579591) and defining the
support region by selecting the highest of the two minima and the lowest of the two maxima
(0.0003306,0.9445475). As can be seen, the region of the common support corresponds to the
interval showing the distribution of the propensity score for the treated individuals. This
means that we have a perfect overlap for the estimation of the ATET effect and that our
estimates would be representative.
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In performing the PSM it is crucial to evaluate the quality of the matching. This means that
we have to know if the balancing property is satisfied. If a good balance is achieved, the
marginal distribution of each covariate is similar in the treated and control groups. There
exist somemethods to check the balancing assumption. One of themethods frequently used is
the “standardized per cent bias” proposed by Rosembaun and Rubin (1985). This is the
percentage difference of the sample means in the treated and control group (full or matched)
subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the
treated and non-treated groups. A reduction of the standardized bias after matching could
prove that the covariates balance is improved by the matching. Rosembaun and Rubin (1985)
consider a standardized difference in means with an absolute value lower than 20 as
acceptable. Another method proposed by Sianesi (2004) consists in comparing the pseudo R2
before and after the matching. If the covariates after the matching are well balanced, the
pseudo R2 should be low. For the calculus of both methods, we use the command pstest in
dF/dX S.E. Sign
Gender (men) 0.030 0.004 ***
Nationality (Spanish) 0.026 0.006 ***
Age groups
<30 years old 0.107 0.005 ***
30–39 years old 0.063 0.005 ***
40–49 years old 0.040 0.004 ***
≥50 years old – – –
Job category
WCHS and WCMS – – –
WCLS 0.005 0.006
BCHS 0.042 0.007 ***
BCMS 0.069 0.010 ***
BCLS 0.008 0.008
Industry
Manufacture of food products, textiles, wood and paper 0.047 0.003 ***
Extraction, energy, chemicals and manufacture of metals 0.013 0.004 ***
Manufacture of machinery, electrical and electronic or transport equipment – – –
Construction (and rest of services) 0.115 0.005 ***
Trade and tourism 0.097 0.005 ***
Transport 0.062 0.003 ***
Region ***
Balearic Is., Canary Is., Andalusia, Ceuta, Melilla and Murcia 0.035 0.004 ***
Aragon, Navarre, La Rioja, Basque Country and Catalonia – – –
Asturias, Galicia and Cantabria 0.003 0.006
Extremadura, Castile-La Mancha and Castile- Leon 0.022 0.009 ***
Valencia ***
Madrid 0.018 0.004 ***
Firm size 0.076 0.004 ***
1–19 workers 0.092 0.004 ***
20–49 workers 0.065 0.003 ***

















Stata. As a matter of example, we report the results after the estimation of a PSM radius
caliper (0.01) in Table A2 of the Appendix. Results are quite similar for the alternative
matching algorithms we use below.
Table A2 reports unmatched (U) and matched (M) means of the covariates for treated and
control groups, the percentage of bias, and the t-test on the hypothesis that the mean value of
each variable is the same in the treatment and control groups. The values of the pseudo R2
before and after the matching are displayed at the bottom of the table. The levels of
standardized bias are very low, always lower than 20 (look at the % bias for M). The t-test
statistic tests the hypothesis that the mean value of each variable is the same in the treatment
group and the control group. It has been calculated before and after the matching. The result is
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5%of significance level after thematching for
each variable. Finally, the pseudoR2declines froma value of 0.445 for the unmatched sample to
a value of 0.003 for the matched sample. In sum, all this information leads to conclude that the
balance of the covariates and the quality of matching we have achieved are quite good [10].
Table 3 provides PSM estimates of STW participation effects using a variety of methods
for creating comparison samples based on P(X). The ATET has been estimated using a
number of alternative algorithms to match participants and nonparticipants: nearest
neighbor without replacement without caliper; nearest neighbor without replacement within
caliper (0.01, 0.05, 0.1); nearest neighbor with replacement within caliper (0.1, 0.05, 0.1); one to
one matching; kernel matching; multiple neighbours (5, 10, 15) and radius caliper (0.01, 0.05,
0.1). The outcome variable is the probability of remaining in the same firm in the future after
the “treatment” (STW in 2009/Q2) has taken place. As we described above, this was done
separately for each individual one, two and three years after participating in a STW scheme.
If STW had the assumed effect of preventing unemployment by keeping the participants
employed relative to non-participants, there should be a positive (or null) difference between
the two groups, so employment would fall significantly faster (or at the same rate) in the
control group of workers than in the treated one. This result would show up as a positive (or
null) ATET. On the contrary, what we observe with all matching estimators is a significantly
negative difference in the employment level between the two groups.
The nearest neighbor estimator with no replacement gives a significant effect equal to a
decrease of the job retention for participants in STW schemes relative to non-participants of
nearly 6 pp lower one year later, about 10 pp lower two years later and 12 pp three years later.
Kernel, radius and multiple neighbours matching provide quite similar results. When using
the multiple neighbor algorithm, we obtain slightly different estimates depending on the
number of neighbours used. Decreasing this number from 15 to 5 increases the estimated
ATET for one and three years later between one and three pp. The latter estimates are closer
to the larger ones obtained with the nearest neighbor algorithms without and with
replacement: the first ones give the highest values for the effects two and three years later,
while the second ones for the effects one year later. The estimates do not change when we
vary the caliper from 0.1 to 0.01 over the nearest neighbor with or without replacement.
Although the nearest neighbor estimations with replacement give higher values for
standardized bias (maybe reflecting that this type of matching trades a reduced bias with an
increase in variance), the estimates of the ATET continue being significant.
In sum, the estimate results indicate that the probability of remaining employed in the
same firm for treated individuals involved in STW is significantly lower relative to other
similar non-treated workers and decreases with the course of time.
5.3 Robustness checks: the role of unobserved factors and IV estimates
Our strategy is based on the assumption that outcomes are independent of the treatment once
we control for measured characteristics and depends on the observable attributes available.
This implies that all existing selection bias is assumed to be determined by the observable
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Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Nearest neighbor without replacement without caliper
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.884 0.056 0.010 5.37
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.822 0.099 0.012 8.04
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.766 0.124 0.013 9.27
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Nearest neighbor without replacement within caliper (0.01)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.819 0.892 0.074 0.013 5.68
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.706 0.831 0.126 0.016 8.10
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.624 0.785 0.161 0.017 9.63
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 1450; observations control, 11676
Nearest neighbor without replacement within caliper (0.05)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.818 0.892 0.074 0.013 5.71
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.704 0.832 0.127 0.015 8.24
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.623 0.786 0.162 0.017 9.76
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 1460; observations control, 11676
Nearest neighbor without replacement within caliper (0.1)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.821 0.892 0.072 0.013 5.57
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.701 0.832 0.131 0.015 8.45
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.621 0.786 0.164 0.017 9.88
Note(s): On support: observations treated: 1460; observations control, 11676
Nearest neighbor with replacement within caliper (0.01)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.935 0.107 0.027 4.00
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.833 0.111 0.034 3.28
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.778 0.136 0.037 3.690
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2276; observations control, 11676
Nearest neighbor with replacement within caliper (0.05)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.935 0.107 0.027 4.00
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.834 0.111 0.034 3.28
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.778 0.136 0.037 3.67












Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Nearest neighbor with replacement within caliper (0.1)
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.935 0.107 0.027 4.00
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.834 0.111 0.034 3.28
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.778 0.136 0.037 3.67
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
1 to 1 matching
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.935 0.107 0.027 4.00
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.834 0.111 0.034 3.28
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.778 0.136 0.037 3.67
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Kernel matching
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.878 0.050 0.013 3.72
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.809 0.086 0.016 5.33
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.755 0.113 0.018 6.44
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Multiple neighbors N 5 15
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.895 0.067 0.017 3.83
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.820 0.097 0.021 4.67
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.779 0.137 0.023 6.03
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Multiple neighbors N 5 10
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.883 0.055 0.016 3.51
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.807 0.084 0.019 4.45
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.753 0.111 0.021 5.34
Note(s): On support: observations treated 2277; observations control, 11676
Multiple neighbors N 5 15
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.880 0.052 0.015 3.44
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.802 0.079 0.018 4.34
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.751 0.109 0.020 5.48
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Table 3. (continued )
IJM
attributes used as covariates in the propensity score estimation. However, non-observable
characteristics can play a role. Any characteristic that is associated with both program
participation and the outcomemeasure, after conditioning onmeasured attributes, can induce
bias (the so-called hidden bias). In matter of STW, unobservable characteristics might be
potentially relevant. Since it is not possible to test directly that PSM estimates are free of
hidden bias, a sensitivity analysis will be carried out in order to assess the robustness of our
results to its failure. We do so by following two strategies. Firstly, the so-called Rosenbaum
Bounds are used. Secondly, we perform estimates based on instrumental variables (IV)
methods.
5.3.1 Using the Rosenbaum bounds.Here the idea is that the probability of being treated is
a function of both observed and unobserved factors (Rosenbaum, 1987). If the
uncounfoundedness assumption holds and there is no hidden bias, it implies that either
the effect of the unobserved factors (γ) takes a value of zero, such that they have no effect on
the probability of participation, or that the unobserved factors are the same across treated
and untreated individuals. Assuming that the probability of being treated follows a logistic
distribution, the only case where the treated and untreated individuals have the same
probability is when eγ 5 1. In this case, the hidden bias is not present and the CIA holds.
Higher values of eγ will mean that there is hidden bias. Becker and Caliendo (2007) have
devised a Stata routine which allows to implement this sensitivity analysis exploiting the
Mantel-Haenszel test statistics (QMH). Rosenbaum (2002) shows that for values of γ > 1, the
QMH test-statistics is bounded by two known distribution QMH
þ and QMH
-. They represent
the case in which the ATET has been overestimated and underestimated, respectively.
Table 4 reports the QMH bounds and their significance level for different values of e
γ and
with three types of PSM estimators. The QMH bounds for e
γ 5 1 show a scenario where the
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Radius caliper 5 0.01
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.887 0.059 0.016 3.61
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.799 0.077 0.020 3.87
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.744 0.102 0.022 4.72
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2276; observations control, 11676
Radius caliper 5 0.05
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.877 0.049 0.015 3.33
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.802 0.079 0.018 4.43
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.747 0.105 0.019 5.44
Note(s): On support: observations treated, 2277; observations control, 11676
Radius caliper 5 0.1
1 year later Unmatched 0.828 0.859 0.031 0.008 3.84
ATT 0.828 0.879 0.051 0.014 3.75
2 years later Unmatched 0.723 0.768 0.045 0.010 4.62
ATT 0.723 0.809 0.087 0.016 5.28
3 years later Unmatched 0.642 0.694 0.052 0.011 4.87
ATT 0.642 0.755 0.113 0.018 6.37





•Nearest neighbor radius caliper 0.01
Γ Q_mhþ Q_mh– p_mhþ p_mh–
1 year later
1 3.829 3.829 0.000 0.000
1.25 7.497 0.198 0.000 0.421
1.5 10.551 2.705 0.000 0.003
1.75 13.192 5.224 0.000 0.000
2 15.535 7.423 0.000 0.000
2 years later
1 4.606 4.606 0.000 0.000
1.25 8.969 0.284 0.000 0.388
1.5 12.594 3.194 0.000 0.001
1.75 15.722 6.189 0.000 0.000
2 18.492 8.802 0.000 0.000
3 years later
1 4.859 4.859 0.000 0.000
1.25 9.543 0.214 0.000 0.415
1.5 13.429 3.530 0.000 0.000
1.75 16.777 6.749 0.000 0.000
2 19.736 9.555 0.000 0.000
•Nearest neighbor radius caliper 0.05
γ Q_mhþ Q_mh– p_mhþ p_mh–
1 year later
1 3.810 3.810 0.000 0.000
1.25 7.479 0.180 0.000 0.429
1.5 10.533 2.724 0.000 0.003
1.75 13.173 5.243 0.000 0.000
2 15.516 7.442 0.000 0.000
2 years later
1 4.587 4.587 0.000 0.000
1.25 8.950 0.265 0.000 0.396
1.5 12.575 3.213 0.000 0.001
1.75 15.703 6.209 0.000 0.000
2 18.473 8.822 0.000 0.000
3 years later
1 4.839 4.839 0.000 0.000
1.25 9.524 0.194 0.000 0.423
1.5 13.410 3.551 0.000 0.000
1.75 16.757 6.770 0.000 0.000
2 19.717 9.577 0.000 0.000
•Nearest neighbor radius caliper 0.1
γ Q_mhþ Q_mh– p_mhþ p_mh–
1 year later
1 3.810 3.810 0.000 0.000
1.25 7.479 0.180 0.000 0.429
1.5 10.533 2.724 0.000 0.003
1.75 13.173 5.243 0.000 0.000




presence of hidden bias
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estimated ATET is free of hidden bias: they are both statistically significant with all the
algorithms used. Higher values of eγ represent the effect an unobserved factor would have to
produce on the odds of being treated in order to explain away the estimated ATET. QMH
þ is
always significant and in the case ofQMH
- our results are only sensitive to the existence of an
observed factor whichwould increase the probability of being treated by 25%but not 50% or
100%. Therefore, we can conclude safely that our estimates are quite robust to the existence
of hidden bias.
5.3.2 IV methods. If it is more likely that individuals with certain observable or
unobservable characteristics are chosen for participation, the estimation of a model that does
not take into account this endogeneity would bias the effects of STW participation on
subsequent employment. In order to avoid this bias, we employ an IV approach, setting out a
model which involves estimating an equation for STW program participation in addition to
an equation that indicates the labor market outcomes of individuals.
Both equations can be estimated simultaneously using a bivariate probit model for two
binary outcomes. The aim of forming a consistent estimator for the impact of STW on the
probability of remaining within the same employer in the future relies on the ability to
construct instruments for the variable indicating exposure to a STW scheme. In the
estimation of this model, participation is instrumented using two variables: whether the
employer was involved in a STW scheme prior to the starting of the observation period in
2009/Q2, and whether the worker received unemployment benefits prior to the participation
in STW. The first variable tries to take account of the fact that the first important factor
explaining the individual probability of being in STW is the employer decision of
implementing such a programme. Here we follow the approach used by Boeri and Bruecker
(2011). The second variable may be proxying relevant aspects that firms and workers’
representatives take into account when they have to choose which workers will participate in
a given STW arrangement: labor costs, expectations and labor hoarding, and fairness (see
Scholz, 2012).
The IV estimate results (shown in Table 5) are in line with the PSM estimates obtained
with the algorithm of the nearest neighbor without replacement, suggesting that the job
retention would be 10 pp lower one year later, about 16 pp lower two years later and 18 pp
three years later for participants in STW schemes relative to non-participants. Therefore,
they confirm our previous findings.
•Nearest neighbor radius caliper 0.1
γ Q_mhþ Q_mh– p_mhþ p_mh–
2 years later
1 4.587 4.587 0.000 0.000
1.25 8.950 0.265 0.000 0.396
1.5 12.575 3.213 0.000 0.001
1.75 15.703 6.209 0.000 0.000
2 18.473 8.822 0.000 0.000
3 years later
1 4.839 4.839 0.000 0.000
1.25 9.524 0.194 0.000 0.423
1.5 13.410 3.551 0.000 0.000
1.75 16.757 6.770 0.000 0.000





6. Conclusions and discussion
This article has investigated whether STW schemes are successful in their objective of
maintaining employment. For that, Spanish longitudinal administrative data has been used
and a worker-level approach adopted, examining whether STW programs achieved to keep
workers employed within their firms. Applying PSM methods, we have estimated the
treatment effect of STW as the ATET, the outcome variable being the individual probability
of remaining working with the same employer.
Our main findings are the following. First, STW schemes do not bring about the expected
effect of preserving jobs (retaining workers) in the short run (within one year after
implementation), although the effect is relatively small, since treated individuals are about 5
pp less likely to remain working with the same employer one year later than similar workers.
This means that there is a significantly negative difference in the job retention between the
two groups, that is a negative treatment effect, so that STW programs would not have the
assumed effect of preventing unemployment by keeping the participants employed relative
to non-participants. Second, workers participating in STW arrangements are significantly
less likely to remain in employment with the same employer two and three years after their
participation when compared with similar non-participating workers. Thus, the negative
effect of participation increases over time.
The empirical strategy followed and the results obtained in this article are not fully
comparable to previous studies that use either country-level or firm-level data. This literature
examines the effect of either the aggregate STW take-up rate or the companies’ participation
in STW schemes on (the change of) employment at either the nation-wide or firm level. The
small positive or null effects encountered in general on either unemployment or employment
do not rule out the possibility that a portion of STWworkers are subsequently laid off, that is
they would be compatible with negative impacts of STW schemes on workers’ retention
within firms. Therefore, as our analysis is based on the comparison of the employment
trajectories of participant and non-participant workers in firms that have used STW
arrangements, our findings are more related to the almost non-existent literature
investigating the impact of STW on individual workers. While some authors (Calavrezo
and Lodin, 2012) have found similar negative effects as ours (although restricted to a very
short period of time: one-quarter), others report either null effects (Speckesser, 2010) or
significantly positive effects (Pavlopoulos and Chkalova, 2019) for STW participants as
compared to similar non-participants.
1 year later 2 years later 3 years later






Wald chi2(46) 7532.20 8963.38 10061.74
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Individuals 11,676 11,676 11,676
Note(s): The estimated marginal effects (standard errors) in each column come from a different regression on
two equations: one equation for STW program participation and another for the labor market outcomes of
individuals. For each regression, the estimates of an indicator variable for exposure to a STW scheme on the
equation for labour market outcomes are reported. Additional explanatory variables include personal, job and
employer attributes (gender, nationality, age, industry, region, job category, job tenure and firm size). Worker’s
participation on STW is instrumented using two variables: whether the employer was involved in a STW
scheme prior to the starting of the observation period in 2009/Q2, and whether the worker received
unemployment benefits prior to the participation in STW. Standard errors are shown in brackets. Significance
levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 5.
Estimate results of IV
recursive bivariate
probit models: the









These differential results may be due to various reasons. One relevant issue to be
considered is that the assessment of STW schemes refers to their effects during a recession
that differed in intensity and duration among countries. Several studies (Hijzen and Martin,
2013; Kruppe and Scholz, 2014) stress that STW arrangements are helpful and have an
economic impact on preserving jobs during a downturn if lack of work is transitory.
Nevertheless, if the downturn continues much longer, the flexibility buffers exhaust, with
unavoidable layoffs consequently. In the case of the 2008 crisis, as it turned out to be V-
shaped for some countries and U-shaped for others, the fast recovery may have favoured the
effectiveness of some STW schemes (such as the German or the Swiss one), while the
prolonged recession may have affected negatively the impact of others (such as the Spanish
one). Thus, the result we obtain might be related to the duration of the economic downturn.
Another factor to take into account is how companies use this work-sharing device with
their workforce. Firms could use STW arrangements to protect their core jobs, thus inducing
differences among workers on the likelihood of remaining within an employer. However, it
could also happen that, as certain jobs andworkers are less likely to survive when a recession
hits the economy, companies used STWprograms to try to preserve jobs in the short-run that
are not economically viable and leave workers that hold less productive jobs in STW,
something that would help them stabilize employment and protect their core employees
during crises, bringing about “displacement effects”. Further research should shedmore light
on the potential relationship between usage of STW schemes and the skill content of jobs.
Despite our findings, it cannot be assumed that the policy recommendation is not to use
STW arrangements as a way to reduce unemployment. There are at least three reasons for
that. One is methodological. Even though the results seem to be quite robust to various
sensitivity analyses, such as the use of different matching algorithms and estimation
strategies, the endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity that plagues this sort of studies
may also be present in our analyses. This would imply, for instance, that workers (and jobs)
whowere chosen for STWmay have some unobservables (not captured by our methods) that
make them more prone to be laid off in the future; or firms with greater financial difficulties
are more likely to take advantage of the STW incentives, so the financial and economic
problems (rather than the STW program) lead to more layoffs in the future.
The second reason is related to the institutional framework. Labour market institutions
and employment policies (employment protection legislation, systems of collective
bargaining, etc.) vary across countries, so similar STW schemes may bring about not only
different STW take-up rates, but also different employment and unemployment outcomes.
While the first issue has been previously analyzed (see Boeri and Bruecker, 2011; Hijzen and
Martin, 2013; Lydon et al., 2019), the second remains unexplored and merits investigation.
And the third reason has to do with the welfare effects and efficiency outcomes associated
with STW programs. In this sense, policymakers should be aware of all the costs associated
with the use of STW schemes (not only fiscal costs but also deadweight and displacement
costs). As far as we know, only Siegenthaler and Kopp (2019) have conducted a cost–benefit
analysis of a STW program (the Swiss one) and concluded that the savings from reduced
unemployment benefit payments was large enough to fully compensate the payments related
to STW.This limited empirical evidence calls for an analysis which provides further evidence
on the efficiency of STWschemes and the resources devoted to them during the recessions, so
further research should be addressed.
Notes
1. Take-up rates increased substantially at the beginning of the recession; they rose from near zero in
the pre-crisis period to over 1% of dependent employment (more than 4.5 million workers involved)





1–2% in Austria, France, Italy, Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Slovakia, and less than 1% in
other countries in 2009 (Hijzen and Martin, 2013). At the same time the resources devoted to them
were substantial; in 2009 expenditure amounted to between 0.1% and 0.3% of GDP in Germany,
Italy and Japan (see Boeri and Bruecker, 2011).
2. Herzog-Stein et al. (2017) attribute the German employment miracle mainly to strong temporary
working-time reductions (not only short-time work but also working-time accounts and
discretionary reductions of regular working hours) by cushioning about 40% of the output
shock. For some nuances on this perspective, see Brenke et al. (2013) and Balleer et al. (2016, 2017).
Antosiewicz and Lewandowski (2017) perform contrafactual simulations to study the factors
behind cyclical fluctuations and differences in adjustments to economic shocks in Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, taking the German economy as the yardstick. They find that those countries
would have fared better if their economies responded to shocks more similarly to the German
economy.
3. In a companion paper (Arranz et al., 2018), we focus our attention on a reform on STW incentives,
examining whether this change had an effect on the probability of remaining in employment, so we
used treatment and control groups before and after the reform and estimated difference-in-
differences regressions and instrumental variable bivariate probit models with endogenous
covariates. Quite differently, the current paper focuses on the difference that participating in STW
may have on the stability of employment, so treatment and control groups are used and Propensity
Score Matching (PSM) models estimated. Therefore, here we try to evaluate the programme itself
and not the effect of a specific reform.
4. Hijzen and Venn (2011) consider the following dimensions: (1) work-sharing requirements: they
specify the range of permissible reductions in weekly hours for short-time workers; (2) eligibility
requirements: they set conditions that employers or workers must meet in order to participate in
STW programs; (3) conditionality requirements: they set behavioural requirements for both
employers and workers; (4) generosity: it determines the cost of participation for both firms and
workers and the maximum length of participation (for firms this depends on the extent to which
they are required to share in the cost of hours not worked, while for workers this depends on the
extent to which they are compensated for hours not worked). Subsequent studies follow this
characterisation.
5. We follow the empirical strategy developed by Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
6. The estimation of the propensity score and the matching procedure has been conducted using the
Stata module psmatch2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). This strategy has also been used
by Kruppe and Scholz (2014) in the context of STW.
7. Arranz et al. (2013) describe a process throughwhich the original information of the different files of
the administrative data source can be organised in such a way as to permit the accurate study of
work histories, while Arranz et al. (2014) use the MCVL to document the importance of recalls in
labour market transitions and estimate a duration model with competing risks of exits in order to
investigate the individual, job and firm attributes that influence the probabilities of leaving
unemployment to return to the same employer or to find a new job. In both studies, the authors
explain in detail the characteristics (and pros and cons) of the MCVL database.
8. We have included several interaction terms (between the job category and the age groups) as well in
order to help eliminate differences between treatment and control groups (see Smith andTodd, 2005;
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The effects of these interactions have never been significant.
9. In this vein, it is a well-known fact that large companies inmanufacturing (especially in sectors such
as the automotive sector, the metalworking industry, and the textile, clothing and leather industry)
are the heaviest users of STW schemes in an economy and their employees are overrepresented in
the group of workers participating in STW (Eurofound, 2010; Boeri and Bruecker, 2011; Calavrezo
and Lodin, 2012).
10. The Rubin’sR and Rubin’sB are reported at the bottom of Table A2. Rubin (2001) recommends that
B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the matched samples to be considered
sufficiently balanced. In our case they lie within these ranges (look at M in Table A2).
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Gender (men) 0.602 0.489 0.798 0.401
Nationality (Spanish) 0.947 0.223 0.974 0.160
Age groups
<30 years old 0.349 0.477 0.126 0.332
30–39 years old 0.371 0.483 0.357 0.479
40–49 years old 0.204 0.403 0.294 0.456
≥50 years old 0.076 0.266 0.222 0.416
Job category
WCHS and WCMS 0.209 0.407 0.152 0.359
WCLS 0.371 0.483 0.148 0.356
BCHS 0.214 0.410 0.342 0.474
BCMS 0.109 0.312 0.303 0.459
BCLS 0.097 0.296 0.055 0.229
Industry
Manufacture of food products, textiles, wood
and paper
0.081 0.273 0.108 0.311
Extraction, energy, chemicals and
manufacture of metals
0.080 0.272 0.381 0.486
Manufacture of machinery, electrical and
electronic or transport equipment
0.062 0.241 0.333 0.471
Construction (and rest of services) 0.310 0.463 0.055 0.229
Trade and tourism 0.332 0.471 0.080 0.271
Transport 0.134 0.340 0.042 0.201
Region
Balearic Is., Canary Is., Andalusia, Ceuta,
Melilla and Murcia
0.152 0.359 0.067 0.250
Aragon, Navarre, La Rioja, Catalonia and
Basque Country
0.358 0.479 0.609 0.488
Asturias, Galicia and Cantabria 0.053 0.224 0.088 0.284
Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and
Castilla-Leon
0.045 0.207 0.078 0.269
Com. Valenciana 0.109 0.311 0.119 0.323
Madrid 0.283 0.450 0.039 0.194
Firm size
1–19 workers 0.387 0.487 0.087 0.282
20–49 workers 0.159 0.365 0.044 0.205















1-<3 years 0.113 0.317 0.058 0.233
3-<6 years 0.202 0.402 0.148 0.355
6-<10 years 0.386 0.487 0.342 0.474
10-<20 years 0.257 0.437 0.387 0.487
>20 years 0.041 0.197 0.066 0.248
Individuals (sample) 11,676 2,277
Note(s): “Job category” is classified asWhite-collar high-skilled occupations, WCHS (managers, workers with
university degree, technical engineers and qualified assistants); White-collar medium-skilled occupations,
WCMS (clerical and workshop heads and assistants); White-collar low-skilled occupations, WCLS
(administrative officials and other clerical workers); Blue-collar high-skilled occupations, BCHS (first and
second class officials); Blue-collar medium-skilled occupations, BCMS (third class officials and specialists) and










Bias |Bias| t p > t
Gender (men) U 0.79842 0.60218 43.8 – 17.99 0
M 0.79833 0.79269 1.3 97.1 0.47 0.637
Nationality (Spanish) U 0.97365 0.9475 13.5 – 5.33 0
M 0.97364 0.97147 1.1 91.7 0.45 0.654
Age groups
<30 years old U 0.12648 0.34858 −54.1 – −21.25 0
M 0.12654 0.13645 −2.4 95.5 −0.99 0.322
30–39 years old U 0.35749 0.37093 −2.8 – −1.22 0.224
M 0.35764 0.36088 −0.7 75.9 −0.23 0.82
40–49 years old U 0.29425 0.20418 20.9 – 9.54 0
M 0.29438 0.27583 4.3 79.4 1.39 0.166
Industry
Manufacture of food products,
textiles, wood and paper
U 0.10848 0.08128 9.3 – 4.24 0
M 0.10852 0.10251 2.1 77.9 0.66 0.509
Extraction, energy, chemicals and
manufacture of metals
U 0.3812 0.08025 76.5 – 41.49 0
M 0.38093 0.39127 −2.6 96.6 −0.72 0.474
Construction and rest of services U 0.05534 0.31029 −69.9 – −25.69 0
M 0.05536 0.05769 −0.6 99.1 −0.34 0.734
Trade and tourism U 0.07993 0.33222 −65.6 – −24.77 0
M 0.07996 0.07246 2 97 0.95 0.34
Transport U 0.04216 0.13378 −32.8 – −12.43 0
M 0.04218 0.04916 −2.5 92.4 −1.13 0.26
Region
Balearic Is., Canary Is., Andalusia,
Ceuta, Melilla and Murcia
U 0.06675 0.15245 −27.7 – −10.88 0
M 0.06678 0.07394 −2.3 91.7 −0.94 0.346
Asturias, Galicia and Cantabria U 0.08827 0.0531 13.8 – 6.53 0
M 0.08831 0.09127 −1.2 91.6 −0.35 0.727
Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha
and Castilla-Leon
U 0.07817 0.04505 13.8 – 6.62 0
M 0.07777 0.08254 −2 85.6 −0.59 0.554
Com. Valenciana U 0.11858 0.1086 3.1 – 1.39 0.164
M 0.11863 0.10504 4.3 −36.2 1.45 0.146
Madrid U 0.03909 0.28289 −70.3 – −25.37 0
M 0.0391 0.03976 −0.2 99.7 −0.11 0.91
Job category
WCLS U 0.14844 0.37059 −52.4 – −20.87 0
M 0.14851 0.13276 3.7 92.9 1.53 0.127
BCHS U 0.34168 0.21394 28.8 – 13.24 0
M 0.34183 0.33497 1.5 94.6 0.49 0.625
BCMS U 0.30259 0.10928 49.2 – 24.78 0








bias, and t-test on the
hypothesis that the
mean value of each










Bias |Bias| t p > t
BCLS U 0.05534 0.09704 −15.8 – −6.36 0
M 0.05492 0.04254 4.7 70.3 1.94 0.052
Firm size
1–19 workers U 0.08696 0.38703 −75.4 – −28.48 0
M 0.08699 0.08663 0.1 99.9 0.04 0.965
20–49 workers U 0.04392 0.15853 −38.7 – −14.53 0
M 0.04394 0.04177 0.7 98.1 0.36 0.718
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med Bias B R
Unmatched 0.445 5525.69 0.00 37.1 32.8 209.7* 0.68
Matched 0.003 20.87 0.467 2 2 13.6 1.06
Note(s):B is Rubin’s B (the absolute standardized difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity
score in the treated and (matched) non-treated group) and R is Rubin’s R (the ratio of treated to (matched) non-
treated variances of the propensity score index) Table A2.
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work schemes
and worker
stability
